This paper presents an augmented framework for analyzing Safety Critical Systems (SCSs) formally. Due to high risk of failure, development process of SCSs is required more attention. Model driven approaches are the one of ways to develop SCSs for accomplishing critical and complex function what SCSs are supposed to do. Two model driven approaches: Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Formal Methods are combined in proposed framework which enables the analysis, designing and testing safety properties of SCSs more rigorously in order to reduce the ambiguities and enhance the correctness and completeness of SCSs. A real time case study has been discussed in order to validate the proposed framework.
Introduction
Embedded softwares are found in almost every field of human life such as in medical equipment, air traffic control systems, car airbag, braking systems, nuclear reactor control and cooling systems, aerospace on-board systems, etc. From last decades, these systems are supposed to do and control more complex functions. A minor fault in such systems may cause severe consequences such as loss of human lives, environmental damage or high economic losses. Such systems whose focus is kept on safety are known as Safety Critical Systems [1] . The deed of complex function of safety critical system spiked the growth of model based techniques for development of such system. These techniques are preferred to apply at early stage of software development process [2] . The idea behind these techniques is to develop and analyze a model of the system instead of the assessment of the final system implementation. The model-driven techniques (MDT) [3] vary in the degree of mathematics used. For example, there is MDT which emphasizes on the graphical representation instead of defining semantics formally such as Unified Modeling Language [4] . On the other hand, there are techniques such as Formal Methods [5] that use rigorous mathematics for defining the semantics. The formal methods are used to develop the system with a high degree of confidence to prevent the failures and enhance the correctness of system behaviour. Generally, the model-driven development (MDD) techniques are used to capture the main features of the system. Moreover, in order to achieve the safety of system, we need to make sure that, even the occurrence of fault in some system components or some unfavorable conditions in the environment, the system will not be put into an unsafe state. This will increase the complexity of system by using the fault tolerance and failure detection mechanisms. Therefore, we require an integrated approach to develop system rigorously which will consider the system integrity along with handling the abstraction, complexity and provide verification by proof. In this thesis, we rely on Z Notation [6] formalism. Since Z notation is an orphan of model-oriented formal methods empire that will start from abstract model and consecutive refinements towards the final model via revised or updated schema for correctness. Revise or updated schema allows us to assure the system safety requirements by stepwise enhancing their representation in the system model along with providing the proof for system properties at various level of abstraction. Figure 1 presents the augmented framework which is wrapping safety properties along with safety analysis is required which includes safety properties, incorporating as the results of safety analysis, transformed into formal models for verification, facilitates formal development and verification of safety-critical systems via pre-defined patterns.
Rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 presents the methodology and 
Methodology and Components
The components of this holistic approach are: Unified Modeling Language and Z Notation [5] ; a Formal Method and described briefly as follow. 2) Model and verify the correctness of Safety Critical Systems.
Unified Modeling Language (UML)
UML
Z Notation
3) Construct and test the Safety Critical Cases.
Methodology
The requirements are captured by using graphical modeling language i.e. Uni- 
Formal Analysis of Safety Critical Systems (SCSs)
This section is divided into three segments.
Capturing and Improving the Readability of Requirements of Safety Critical Systems
The requirements are usually written in natural language. To get a better understanding of system functionality, graphical languages such a Unified Modeling • "Include"-Include is used to extract use case fragments that are duplicated in multiple use cases. The included use case cannot stand alone and the original use case is not complete without the included one.
• "Extend"-Extend is used when a use case adds steps to another first class use case.
Model and Verify the Correctness of Safety Critical Systems
The second phase of software Development process is the design phase. In this thesis, formal transformation of model is done by refinement in the design phase. The class diagram forms the root for system structure and sequence diagram forms the basis for system behaviour respectively. According to propose approach, the system development begins with an abstract system model that is further elaborated gradually by providing implementation details in a number of model transformation steps. This approach provides us support to handle the system complexity and to develop the system correct-by-construction. In addition, refinement processes are iterative in nature and feedback is provided by verification. Thus, contradicting, inconsistent and incomplete requirements specifications, design specification can be discovered.
Since class diagram is the basis for system structure and helps in designing modules of a system, but due to component of UML family, lack preciousness in semantic. To address this problem, we construct formal model for class diagram and sequence diagram in order to capture static and dynamic aspect of the system respectively. It guides the developer starting from the informal representation of class and sequence diagram (with UML) to building the corresponding parts of system module via formal modeling and verification in Z Notation and accompany toolsets. In the scope of this approach, we propose the automated Theorem Prover for demonstrating that formal system models are themselves are well defined. Moreover, in order to assure that there is no logical inconsistency and no model element contains any infeasible mathematical definition, simulation of Z specification has been done with Z/EVES [8] tool.
Construct and Test the Safety Critical Cases
Testing [9] plays an important role for checking the correctness of system implementations. To test system, test cases are formed and system behavior has been observed during execution. Based on test execution, the decision is made for the correctly functioning of the system. However, the criterion for the correctness of test cases has been specified in the system specification. A specification prescribes "What" part of the system i.e. the function that a system supposes to do and accordingly forms the foundation for testing criteria. As system specifications are documented in natural language (informal), which is generally incomplete and ambiguous in nature, due to this many problems may occur in testing processes such as incompleteness, ambiguous and inconsistency in test specifications. With an unclear specification, it is next to impossible to predict how the implemented system will behave; consequently testing will be difficult as it is not clear what to test. This become more severs specifically in case of Safety Critical System. We propose an approach to rigorous construction of structured test cases by formalization of test-specification. In other words, formal transformation of testing criteria [10] 
Simulation Results
This section is divided into two parts: section 4.1 presents the formal model for safety Critical systems and section 4.2 represents the verification of results with automated Theorem Prover. Figure 2 shows the formal model for requirements and design of SCSs by formal transforming the use case, class diagram, and sequence diagram into Z notation element; Schema-a notion for structuring the formal specification written in Z notation. Moreover the formal model for testing specification is depicted in Figure 3 .
Formal Model
The testing strategies are broadly divided into two categories: White box testing and Black box testing. White box testing focuses on internal structure of 
Simulation
To ensure the correctness and completeness of specification, design draft and test specification; the formal model is further verified on automated Theorem Prover i.e. Z/EVES in Figure 6 .
The testing criteria's for construction of safety test case is formally verified in Figure 7 and Figure 8 .
The RTMS elements are further verified on Z/EVES in order to enrich the validation of proposed framework which is shown in Figure 9 .
The Table 1 presents the overall model analysis results on automated Theorem Prover and the parameters are: Syntax & Type checking, Domain checking and Proof by Reduction.
Conclusions
The proposed framework is a complete, formal, framework which can be used to develop the safety-critical system, with a combination of graphical modeling language. This framework poses the following characteristics:
• Complete-The proposed method covers all the phases of the software development process i.e. starting from specification to design followed by verification and validation.
• Formal-This method uses rigorous mathematics for specification, verification and validation. Consequently, provides high level of confidence as compared to conventional manual and informal methods. • Framework-Framework presents a 2-step verification and validation approach, helps in detecting errors in early phases of development process.
• User-friendly-Using graphical modeling languages initially to formal transformation, this methodology assists various level of abstraction, which helps different users to understand the system behaviour with ease.
• Scalable-The approach is proficient in verifying the system (safety properties) of industrial size by allowing inductive reasoning and model checking together.
• Facilitate the safety assurance process of formally developed safety-critical systems, by an established link between formal specification and safety cases.
• Enhance the processes of Requirements Elicitation, Formal modeling and Verification.
• Facilitate the system certification by showing how to incorporate safety requirements into Formal model.
• Allows using the verification results of formal models as the evidence for construction of safety cases.
